Stability in Cosmology, from Einstein to Inflation by McCoy, C.D.
Stability in Cosmology, from Einstein to
Inflation
C.D. McCoy
Abstract I investigate the role of stability in cosmology through two episodes
from the recent history of cosmology: (1) Einstein’s static universe and Edding-
ton’s demonstration of its instability, and (2) the flatness problem of the hot big
bang model and its claimed solution by inflationary theory. These episodes illus-
trate differing reactions to instability in cosmological models, both positive ones
and negative ones. To provide some context to these reactions, I also situate them in
relation to perspectives on stability from dynamical systems theory and its episte-
mology. This reveals, for example, an insistence on stability as an extreme position
in relation to the spectrum of physical systems which exhibit degrees of stability
and fragility, one which has a pragmatic rationale, but not any deeper one.
1 Introduction
Although the meeting in Bern where this paper was presented commemorated Ein-
stein’s completion of his general theory of relativity, its date marks the 100th an-
niversary of the publication of another of his famous papers, “Kosmologische Be-
trachtungen zur allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie” (Cosmological Considerations in
the General Theory of Relativity) (Einstein, 1917), the founding paper of the field
of relativistic cosmology. In this paper Einstein proposed an unchanging, tempo-
rally infinite, and spatially finite relativistic model of the large-scale universe, the
so-called ‘Einstein static universe’. Other cosmological models of general relativ-
ity soon followed, for example by de Sitter (1917a,b,c), Friedman (1922, 1924), and
Lemaıˆtre (1927). Despite mounting observational evidence that the universe was not
static and was in fact expanding, as these latter models allowed, Einstein maintained
belief in his model for many years, until finally publicly disavowing it in (Einstein,
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1931). The decisive point for Einstein was not this observational evidence however;
rather he seems to have been convinced by Eddington of the unsuitability of his
model due to its instability (Nussbaumer, 2014).
So began a minor, albeit sometimes significant thread through the history of mod-
ern cosmology, tying together episodes involving the theme of stability. It is this
theme which is my topic. While there are, admittedly, many greater themes in the
history of cosmology, stability has nevertheless on occasion played an appreciable
and important role, as I aim to show. So, what has been the role of stability consider-
ations in cosmology? And also, has the attitude to stability changed over the years?
This latter question is especially worth considering, when we remind ourselves of
the great advances in the study of nonlinear dynamics which crucially involve the
concept of instability, such as the development of chaos theory. To help answer these
questions I examine the Einstein-Eddington episode just mentioned (§2), and also
the more recent ‘flatness problem’ of the big bang model (§3), which ushered in the
contemporary paradigm of inflationary cosmology in the 1980s.
As said, Einstein himself was ultimately convinced to abandon his cosmological
model on stability grounds, when nearly all other physicists had already been sus-
picious of it on observational grounds well before 1931. Whereas Einstein cited the
instability of the model as cause enough for rejecting his model, other physicists,
such as Eddington and Lemaıˆtre, instead sought to make use of this instability as a
means for effecting a transition to an expanding universe, through some manner of
physical perturbation. Although the static universe idea maintained some currency
in the following decades, it was eventually dropped altogether by cosmologists in
favor of the past-finite expanding universe models of Friedman and Lemaıˆtre, in
particular in the guise of the hot big bang model, developed especially by Gamow
and his collaborators in the 1940s.
Later, however, the big bang model was brought into question due to its alleged
‘fine-tuning problems’, which led to the widespread adoption of inflationary theory
in the 1980s on the grounds (at least initially) that it solved these problems. One of
these problems is the flatness problem. The flatness problem begins with observa-
tions which have increasingly suggested that the spatial geometry of the universe is
nearly flat (or Euclidean). The spatially flat big bang models are dynamically unsta-
ble however: any slight deviation from flatness results in an increasingly divergent
curvature. Yet this instability was not given by cosmologists as the sole reason to
seek an alternative model; rather, as a consequence of this instability, they inferred
from the observed high degree of flatness an extraordinary degree of fine-tuning in
the initial conditions of the universe. It is this fine-tuning that was taken by cosmol-
ogists as the reason to reject the simple big bang model and implement a dynamical
means (inflation) for insuring, among other things, the stability of spatial flatness.
Even this quick sketch evinces an interesting variety of attitudes towards stability
held by the physicists involved. Nevertheless, when one scrutinizes their arguments,
it is not readily apparent why they took the attitudes that they did. It is not clear,
for example, what they took the physical significance of instability (or lack thereof)
to be, how to characterize the physical source of the perturbations they imagine,
which variations matter, how to ground the ‘improbability’ of finely-tuned states,
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and so on. Greater historical and individual context are surely needed to answer
these questions fully. However, some useful progress can be made by considering a
seemingly once common conceptual paradigm: that stability is a necessary feature
of physical systems (and models based on them). The ubiquity of this paradigm,
perhaps, can account for some reactions to the instability of the Einstein static uni-
verse. Later, this paradigm came to be seen as mere dogma thanks to the aforemen-
tioned advances in dynamical systems theory, as it became ever more evident that
one should not, indeed cannot, expect dynamical models to be stable, except in very
simple cases. Models exhibiting aspects of what is sometimes called fragility, that
is, some degree of instability, have found important applications in physics and be-
yond, a particularly notable example, again, being those models studied in chaos
theory. Many ideas and much mathematics concerning such models were developed
even before the 20th century, yet the widespread realization of their physical signif-
icance and ubiquity has grown out of research in nonlinear dynamical systems only
since the 1960s. In the final section of the paper (§4), I draw especially on ideas
and arguments presented in (Tavakol, 1991) concerning these developments in or-
der to assess and reflect on the theme of stability in cosmology, particularly the two
episodes discussed in the next two sections.
2 The Einstein Static Universe
The first episode is the story of Einstein’s static universe model. Besides introducing
this model, the first relativistic spacetime model of the universe, (Einstein, 1917) is
also famous for his modification of the field equations to include the cosmological
constant.1 He was moved to make this modification in light of what he took to be a
certain paradox in cosmological models involving gravitation, both Newtonian and
relativistic. This paradox is not so relevant to the discussion here, nor are most of
Einstein’s motivations for introducing his cosmological model and the cosmological
constant.2 Thus, rather than following Einstein’s fairly idiosyncratic presentation of
his model, I will specify the Einstein static universe in modern geometrical terms,
for this will help make the structure of the model and its instability more manifest.
In these terms one understands a relativistic spacetime as a geometrical model of
the general theory of relativity (Hawking and Ellis, 1973; Wald, 1984; Malament,
2012). It is a differentiable manifoldM equipped with a Lorentzian metric field g.
The matter content of the spacetime is specified by the stress energy tensor field T
and the cosmological constant is denoted by the scalar field Λ. The metric field g
and stress energy field T associated withM satisfy the Einstein field equations with
cosmological constant (EFE-Λ):
R− 1
2
Rg−Λg = 8piT, (1)
1 For commentaries on this paper, see (Smeenk, 2014; O’Raifeartaigh et al, 2017).
2 See, e.g., (Norton, 1992; Earman, 2001; Kragh, 2007) for discussions of this background.
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where R is the Ricci tensor and R is the Ricci scalar, both obtainable from g. The
Einstein static universe can then be specified as the non-vacuum (T , 0) relativistic
spacetime which satisfies the following conditions: (1) it is spatially homogeneous
and isotropic, and (2) it is static.
A spacetime that is spatially homogeneous and isotropic possesses a congruence
of timelike curves such that it is possible to foliate spacetime by a one-parameter
family of spacelike hypersurfaces orthogonal to the timelike curves. Given this folia-
tion, spatial homogeneity and isotropy jointly require that there exists some timelike
vector field such that for each spatial hypersurface Σλ, where λ denotes the temporal
parameter along the timelike curves, the geometrical characteristics of all points in
each such hypersurface are the same.3 With these symmetries, the matter content
of the spacetime can be represented as a perfect fluid with energy density ρ and
pressure p. The EFE-Λ will then reduce to two coupled equations (the Friedman
equations):
3H2 + 3κ = 8piρ+Λ; (2)
3H˙ + 3H2 + 4pi(ρ+ 3p) = Λ, (3)
where H is the Hubble parameter, specifying the expansion of space, and κ is the
curvature of space.4 Only Λ is assumed to remain constant in time (also, deriva-
tives with respect to the temporal parameter are denoted by overdots). The space-
times thus obtained are generally called the Friedman(-Lemaıˆtre)-Robertson-Walker
(FRW or FLRW) models.
Among the FRW models the Einstein static universe is a special spacetime due
to the second condition: staticity. A static FRW spacetime is one where H = 0; that
is, it neither expands nor contracts. This simplifies the EFE-Λ equations further, to
3κ = 8piρ+Λ; (4)
4pi(ρ+ 3p) = Λ. (5)
Einstein’s paper considers only the case where matter is pressureless ‘dust’. In
this special case (p = 0), the universe is static when Λ = 4piρ = κ.5 It also follows
that space is positively curved in the static universe, since κ = 4piρ > 0, and that Λ is
a positive cosmological constant. For if κ = 0, then ρ = Λ = 0—we have Minkowski
spacetime, a spacetime without matter, and if κ < 0, then ρ < 0, violating the weak
energy condition. Thus, the only non-vacuum spacetime that satisfies the Einstein
static universe conditions is the positively curved one. Since the only possible spatial
3 A more precise characterization of this condition are given in (Malament, 2012, §2.11). See also
(McCabe, 2004; McCoy, 2016).
4 The Hubble parameter H is related to the expansion scalar θ (from the Raychaudhuri equation)
by θ = 3H. The spatial curvature κ is related to the Ricci scalar RΣ of the spatial hypersurfaces
in FRW spacetimes by RΣ = −6κ. Cf. (Malament, 2012, §2.11). Note that my κ is the negative of
Malament’s K and he uses normal and script fonts to differentiate the spacetime and spatial Ricci
tensors and scalars, respectively, where I introduce subscripts for the the spatial ones.
5 Cf. (Einstein, 1923, 187). See also (Malament, 2012, 194).
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topology of such a spacetime is the sphere, it follows that the Einstein static universe
is spatially finite, a circumstance which Einstein found particularly favorable.6
In the more general case, where p , 0, we may repeat the previous argument,
obtaining essentially the same results. If κ = 0, then ρ = −p and the ‘matter’ content
of the universe acts as an inverse cosmological constant which offsets the ‘actual’
cosmological constant Λ. In other words, we have just found Minkowski spacetime
again. If κ < 0, then ρ < 0 or ρ+ p < 0, in either case violating the weak energy
condition. Thus, only in the case that κ > 0 do we have a physically reasonable
non-vacuum spacetime, and, again, it is one that is spatially finite.
In the same year as Einstein proposed the static universe model, de Sitter pro-
posed an alternative model of the universe (de Sitter, 1917a,b,c). For the sake of
comparison, it is worth describing his model briefly. The de Sitter universe is a vac-
uum spacetime (at large scales, anyway) which expands at a constant rate due to the
presence of, in effect, a (positive) cosmological constant. Assuming spatial homoe-
geneity and isotropy again for the sake of comparison to FRW models, the EFE-Λ
in this case reduce to
3H2 + 3κ = Λ; (6)
3H˙ + 3H2 = Λ. (7)
If we choose a foliation of de Sitter spacetime where the spatial hypersurfaces are
flat (κ = 0), we see that H˙ = 0 and
3H2 = Λ; (8)
that is, spatial expansion (given our arbitrary choice of what space is in the de Sitter
universe) is constant and proportional to the (positive) cosmological constant. As a
consequence, geodesics diverge from one another exponentially in time. Also, like
the Einstein static universe, time in the de Sitter universe is past and future infinite,
so the the de Sitter universe neither begins nor ends.
Much of the debate in the 1920s focused on these two cosmological models.
Despite the lack of matter in de Sitter’s universe, it made a stronger connection to
available cosmological observations, especially by furnishing a possible explana-
tion for Slipher’s recent observations of redshifting in the spectral lines of galaxies
(Slipher, 1912, 1915, 1917, 1921). Einstein was unaware of the latest observational
results in astronomy and instead relied on his intuition about the nature of the uni-
verse, holding ‘philosophically’ that it was static and spatially finite. Uncertainty
and confusion about coordinate choices and the geometrical structure of the mod-
els, as well as about the actual physical features of the universe accessible through
observation, stymied understanding for many years. Perhaps for these reasons, it
6 Thus,M = S 3 ×R, which is why the Einstein static universe is sometimes called the ‘cylindrical
universe’.
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was not until end of the decade that the instability of the Einstein static universe
was noticed and communicated by Eddington (1930).7
Eddington considers only a small scalar perturbation of the density ρ in a universe
consisting of dust (p = 0). Combining the Friedman equations by eliminating the
curvature term, we have
H˙ = Λ−4piρ. (9)
As noted above, the Einstein static universe is the universe where 4piρ = Λ. Clearly a
“slight disturbance” which causes ρ to increase or decrease will lead the universe to
contract or expand, respectively—“evidently Einstein’s universe is unstable” (Ed-
dington, 1930, 670). We might also consider the case where the pressure is positive,
in which case we have
H˙ = Λ−4pi(ρ+ p). (10)
A slight disturbance in the density or the pressure would, however, again clearly
lead to a changing Hubble parameter.
One might easily question Eddington’s demonstration on a couple of points.
First, why should the relevant equations of motion be those pertaining to the FRW
class of spacetimes and not all relativistic spacetimes? Eddington considers only a
single kind of perturbation, one which is consistent with such universes: a homeoge-
neous and isotropic spacelike perturbation of the energy density. This is enough to
show that the Einstein static universe is unstable, if we suppose that a model is un-
stable when it is unstable with respect to any perturbation. Still, one might wonder
whether such a perturbation is physically significant. Eddington and other cosmol-
ogists thought so for a time, adopting a vision of the universe as having been in a
past-infinite state described by Einstein’s model, but which at some point transitions
via a perturbation to an expanding epoch (and eventually becoming approximated
by de Sitter’s model after much expansion) (Robertson, 1933). What physical pro-
cess could lead to a perturbation of this kind in the Einstein static universe?
In typical physical systems, a model that is dynamically unstable is liable to be
pushed out of the unstable state by physical perturbations from the environment. In-
deed, one might even say that it is improbable for a system to persist in such a state
for any appreciable amount of time. But this simplistic idea cuts no ice in cosmol-
ogy, as there is no external environment from which perturbations impinge on the
universe. Obviously the perturbation could not come from ‘outside the universe’.
Such a perturbation would be “supernatural”, as Eddington says.
He claims, however, that “the initial small disturbance can happen without su-
pernatural interference” (Eddington, 1930, 670). The proposal he initially moots is
that the gravitational collapse of “uniformly diffused nebula” into galaxies would
lead to just such a perturbation: “the actual mass may not alter but the equivalent
mass to be used in applying the equations for a strictly uniform distribution must
be slightly altered” (Eddington, 1930, 670). But if no new mass would be created
in gravitational collapse, it is difficult to see why the ‘equivalent mass’ used in the
7 Eddington acknowledges Lemaıˆtre’s investigation into the Einstein and de Sitter universes
(Lemaıˆtre, 1927), where, he says, “it is at once apparent from his formulæ that the Einstein world
is unstable” (Eddington, 1930, 668).
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Friedman equations would change. If the volume of space does not change, and the
amount of matter in space does not change, how could the energy density change?
This could occur under some conversion process of matter into radiation, which,
as Eddington notes, would not change ρ but would change p. If such a conver-
sion were to occur, though, it ought to lead to an increase in ρ or p, which would
lead to spatial contraction.8 As the aforementioned redshift observations by Slipher
already suggested, along with Hubble’s estimates of the distances to galaxies (Hub-
ble, 1929), space should be expanding in the model, not contracting. Thus a physical
mechanism which could result in the Einstein static universe falling out of its static
‘equilibrium’ into an expanding universe seems precluded.
Nevertheless, Eddington’s argument that the static universe was unstable con-
vinced Einstein to abandon his model, as the latter acknowledged in (Einstein,
1931). That paper is perhaps better known as the paper in which he abandons the
“unsatisfactory” cosmological constant, instead favoring the spherical, expanding
FRW spacetime discovered first by Friedman (1922).9 In the paper Einstein states
two principal reasons for abandoning his static universe: (1) that it was unstable, as
Eddington had convinced him previously in conversation, and (2) due to the obser-
vational results of Hubble.10 However, although he acknowledges the observational
results indicating the expansion of the universe, he insists that the instability of the
model was reason enough not to ascribe physical significance to the static universe.
Now, one might ignore the evident significance of instability to the participants
in this episode, noting that the outcome was nothing more than the adoption of mod-
els that were more empirically adequate than the Einstein static universe (and the
de Sitter universe)—a humdrum example of empirical progress guiding theoretical
progress. This is not how the participants reasoned however. Indeed, it is especially
notable that their reactions differed to the instability discovered by Eddington. Ein-
stein, for example, saw instability as undermining the physical significance of a
model, whereas Eddington, Lemaıˆtre, and others saw it as an opportunity to intro-
duce a mechanism for creating complex structure in the universe.
Unfortunately, none of them expand on their particular views on stability in any
of their contributions. One argument, which might be gleaned from various remarks
in these papers, begins with the obvious: the universe is not perfectly uniform, as
is supposed in the Einstein static universe and the other prominent cosmological
models. Now, if we represent deviations from uniformity as perturbations in our
models and suppose that the actual universe should be a ‘perturbation away’ from
our favored idealized model, then the perturbed model which represents the actual
8 This point was investigated soon after Eddington’s discovery, especially by McVittie and Mc-
Crea. See (McCrea and McVittie, 1930, 1931; McVittie, 1931; Dingle, 1933; Tolman, 1934; Sen,
1935a,b). Lemaıˆtre proposed an alternative mechanism for the departure from equilibrium, which
he called a “stagnation” (Lemaıˆtre, 1931).
9 One year later, Einstein and de Sitter (1932) argued for the flat, expanding FRW spacetime, on the
grounds that there is no direct observational evidence for non-zero spatial curvature. This model,
the Einstein-de Sitter universe, became the standard model of cosmology for much of the 20th
century and will reappear in the following section.
10 See (O’Raifeartaigh and McCann, 2014) for a translation and discussion of this paper. See also
(Nussbaumer, 2014) for further analysis of Einstein’s reasons.
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universe should not deviate significantly from the static model (or other idealized
model) over time. Otherwise the static model is a poor approximation of the actual
universe and inapt for prediction, explanation, etc. The instability of the Einstein
static universe suggests just this: any slight deviation from the Einstein static uni-
verse results in significant qualitative differences between the perturbed model and
the unperturbed model.
This objection, however, is not by itself sufficient to reject the static model com-
pletely. So long as the static model is a sufficiently good approximation to the actual
universe, it can be used to describe and make predictions about the universe. Of
course, as it happens the static model fits poorly with observations, which is surely
reason enough to reject it. Yet if it had turned out that observations fit it well enough,
what reason could instability provide to abandon it, at least as an approximation?
It appears that rejecting the Einstein static universe merely on the grounds that it
is unstable can only involve a dubious insistence on stability in physical models.
In contrast to this attitude, Eddington and other cosmologists held on to the static
universe for a time, even despite a lack of any observational evidence for it (and pre-
sumably for ‘philosophical’ reasons), recognizing that its instability could be used
to effect a ‘phase transition’ in the large-scale universe. Thus we see in this episode
both a degree of positivization of instabilities (Schmidt, 2011, 223) in cosmology
and what appears to be a thorough rejection of them in line with a ‘dogma of stabil-
ity’ (Abraham and Marsden, 1978, xxii).
3 The Flatness Problem
The second episode is the story of the flatness problem. It is one of the fine-tuning
problems of the hot big bang model which led to the widespread adoption of infla-
tionary theory by theoretical cosmologists in the 1980s, due to inflationary theory’s
alleged solution of them. As mentioned above, the flatness problem begins with
observations suggesting that the universe’s spatial curvature is approximately flat,
when the universe is modeled with a FRW spacetime. The flatness problem arises
in part because the Friedman equations can be used to demonstrate the dynamic
instability of flat curvature under small perturbations, much in the same way that
Eddington showed that the Einstein static universe was unstable. The problem is not
just the presence of this instability however. The crucial problem, according to pro-
ponents of inflation, is that the initial conditions of the universe had to be extremely
fine-tuned, due to this instability, for the universe to be anywhere near as flat as
observations suggested. It is this fine-tuning that they reject, not the instability per
se. Inflationary theory purports to solve this fine-tuning problem with a short stage
of exponential expansion in the very early universe (inflation), which reverses the
dynamical stability of FRW universes, thereby making flat FRW spacetimes dynam-
ically stable under perturbations (at least during inflation).
The big bang model of the universe is based on the expanding FRW spacetimes,
which were introduced in the previous section. These may have positive, negative, or
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flat spatial curvature, which is determined by the density and pressure of spacetime’s
contents. It has been an empirical matter to determine what the (large-scale) curva-
ture of space is. Although observations have long suggested that the flat model (the
so-called ‘Einstein-de Sitter universe’ of (Einstein and de Sitter, 1932)) is roughly
accurate, it cannot be excluded that space has a positive or negative curvature (nor
could it, since observations do not have infinite accuracy). Indeed, for aesthetic rea-
sons, many physicists have preferred the spatially finite, positively curved model
(the ‘Einstein-Friedman universe’ of (Friedman, 1922) and (Einstein, 1931)). In any
case, it is this observed approximate flatness that is the empirical fact on which the
flatness problem is based.
To see how the problem arises, let us revisit the basic assumptions which lead
to the FRW spacetimes. First, we suppose that there is a congruence of timelike
curves, such that spacetime can be foliated by a one-parameter family of space-
like hypersurfaces (‘Weyl’s principle’). Then we assume that there exists a foliation
where the spacelike hypersurfaces are homogeneous and isotropic (‘the cosmologi-
cal principle’). The spacetimes satisfying these conditions are the FRW spacetimes.
They obey the Friedman equations:
3H2 + 3
k
a2
= 8piρ; (11)
3H˙ + 3H2 + 4pi(ρ+ 3p) = 0, (12)
where I have replaced the curvature κ used above by k/a2. The parameter k specifies
the sign of the curvature: +1 for positively curved, -1 for negatively curved, and 0
for flat. The scale factor a parameterizes the expansion and curvature of space; it is
related to the Hubble parameter H by H = a˙/a. One conventionally takes the ‘big
bang’ itself to occur at a = 0 and the present to be at a = 1.11
A flat FRW spacetime has k = 0. Only a specific value of the energy density ρ
will result in a universe with exactly flat spatial curvature. This is the critical density
ρcr. It is obtained from the first Friedman equation by setting k to zero:
ρcr =
3
8pi
H2. (13)
The present Hubble parameter H0 and the present density ρ0 may be determined
from observations, thus allowing the comparison of ρ0 and ρcr. These have been
determined to be extremely close in recent years, although their approximate equal-
ity has been conspicuous for many decades. Thus, if our modeling assumptions are
correct, we appear to live in a (very nearly) spatially flat universe.
It is straightforward to demonstrate the dynamical instability that features in the
flatness problem, One way is to modify the first Friedman equation slightly, dividing
it by the critical density ρcr and defining a new parameter, the density parameter
Ω = ρ/ρcr. Then one has
11 Of course the singularity is not a point of spacetime and did not occur according to the general
theory of relativity, so a = 0 is strictly not a valid parameter value of the scale factor, but any a > 0
is.
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1−Ω = − k
(aH)2
. (14)
As we would like to see what happens when there are small departures from flatness
and we do not care whether the departures are positive or negative, we may for
convenience take the absolute value of both sides and ignore the k = 0 case. We then
have the following equation:
|1−Ω| = 1
(aH)2
. (15)
So long as the universe is expanding, the right hand side is always increasing in
time. Its time derivative is
d
dt
1
(aH)2
= −2a¨
a˙3
. (16)
If the universe only has normal matter in it, then a¨ is always negative (normal matter
gravitates and hence decelerates expansion). Therefore we may conclude that |1−Ω|
increases in time under small perturbations from flatness, and increasingly so.12
The instability of flat FRW spacetimes allows a fine-tuning argument to be made
based on it.13 Our universe is presently observed to be expanding with a nearly
flat spatial geometry. If it is exactly flat, then its initial conditions in the very early
universe were such that it had exactly the critical density. If, however, it had ever
so slightly different initial conditions, such that it had slightly less or slightly more
than the critical density, then it would be nowhere near spatially flat today: it would
be highly curved, in most cases to a degree that would not permit our existence.
In other words, only initial conditions in a very narrow range would result in the
presently observed universe. The big bang model, in short, requires that our universe
be highly fine-tuned. One can do various calculations to get a sense of the degree of
fine-tuning; Baumann (2009, 23), for example, calculates the fine-tuning to be one
part in 1055 for initial conditions placed at the GUT scale.
There are various reactions one might have to the fact of this fine-tuning. One is,
“so what?” If we trust our models and observations, then it is simply a logical con-
sequence that the universe had to have had such-and-such initial conditions, within
a range suggested by the uncertainty in observations. What does it matter that they
could not have been much different? After all, presumably any physical system re-
quires some particular initial conditions. Such an attitude appears to be partly behind
the analysis of Earman and Mosterı´n (1999, 19–20), and it is presumably the reac-
tion that many other philosophers of science, especially strongly empiricist ones,
would take.
12 For positively curved FRW spacetimes this is true only up to a point. These universes reach a
maximum curvature, after which they contract into a ‘big crunch’.
13 Fine-tuning arguments take different forms and invoke varying considerations, as the general no-
tion of fine-tuning arises in other contexts besides relativistic cosmology, for example high energy
physics (Williams, 2015) and the notorious ‘fine-tuning for life’ problem debated by scientists,
philosophers, and the religious. See (Friederich, 2018) for an introduction to these latter kinds.
Dicke apparently was responsible for popularizing the flatness problem among physicists. See, e.g.
(Dicke and Peebles, 1979).
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This is not the attitude that theoretical cosmologists take. They say that this fine-
tuning indicates that the initial conditions required by the hot big bang model are
special and therefore problematic. Unfortunately, they are not so clear about what
exactly makes fine-tuned initial conditions problematic (McCoy, 2015). Cosmolo-
gists usually interpret this specialness in terms of likelihoods or probabilities. How-
ever, there are serious problems, both conceptual and technical, with interpreting
fine-tuning problems in cosmology in this way (McCoy, 2018a). If cosmologists are
merely reporting on their subjective degrees of belief, then it is unclear why anyone
else should take their pronouncements very seriously. There should be some objec-
tive justification of likelihood attributions. Since likelihoods or probabilities are not
part of the theory of general relativity, though, it is quite difficult to see from where
they might come.14
Recalling the earlier episode’s focus on stability, perhaps the specialness of fine-
tuned initial conditions in the flatness problem is owed simply to the instability of
the dynamics for the condition of flatness. Then, at least, it is justified to say that
flatness is special, for under the FRW dynamics it is indeed unstable (and indeed, if
this were the problem, then inflationary theory does solve the problem, by revers-
ing the instability of flatness (McCoy, 2015)). The difficulty in this case, however,
is the same as that raised before: namely, sustaining the claim that this instability
is problematic. Again, cosmologists in the 1980s and afterwards generally do not
seem to take the instability of flatness to be a problem as such however; rather the
instability of flatness coupled with the observed approximate flatness of the universe
requires special initial conditions, which they take to be problematic. Thus the re-
action to instability is somewhat different in this episode compared to the previous
one. Nevertheless, we see that in both cases instability is taken to have important
consequences for theorizing, although what consequences those are vary, especially
depending on whether instability is seen as a vice or a virtue. Moreover, some of
the reactions, it seems, may be based on dubious philosophical assumptions, such
as the aforementioned ‘dogma of stability’ (Schmidt, 2011) or the improbability of
special initial conditions (Callender, 2004).
4 Stability and Fragility
While there are a variety of threads that one could pull from these two episodes,
leading in many different directions, in this final section I want to keep a hold on
the notion of stability and follow it into a more general context, particularly as it
appears in dynamical systems theory. The precise notion of stability in dynamical
systems theory is usually attributed to Andronov and Pontryagin, in their article
“Grubye sistemy” (Coarse systems) (Andronov and Pontryagin, 1937), although this
14 Interestingly, several physicists have made likelihood-based arguments that there is actually no
flatness problem (Gibbons et al, 1987; Hawking and Page, 1988; Coule, 1995; Gibbons and Turok,
2008; Carroll and Tam, 2010). Their arguments, however, suffer from problems more or less as
serious as those of the flatness problem supporters (Schiffrin and Wald, 2012; McCoy, 2017).
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was preceded by important work by Poincare´ and Birkhoff, among others.15 Around
the same time as this latter pioneering early work was being done on dynamical
systems theory, the epistemic significance of stability was emphasized by Duhem
(1962, Part 2, Ch. 3) and Poincare´ (1952, I.IV.II)—even in the face of a growing
appreciation of the mathematical significance of instability in dynamical systems.
I will make use of the narrative given by (Tavakol, 1991) to situate some of the
main philosophical considerations. Tavakol argues that scientists generally assume,
usually implicitly, that both real systems and mathematical models of those systems
are structurally stable, that is, adopt the dogma of stability. He characterizes this
assumption as follows (Tavakol, 1991, 148):
(a) Real systems are structurally stable in the sense that they do not change their qualitative
behavior under small general perturbations.
(b) For mathematical models to be viable as models of real systems they similarly need to
be structurally stable.
So, for example, in the context of cosmology this amounts to assuming that the
universe does not change its qualitative behavior under small general perturbations
and that our mathematical models should respect this. Since the Einstein static uni-
verse certainly does change its qualitative behavior under even a small scalar per-
turbation, changing from a static to a non-static universe, it violates the assumption.
Similarly, since the Einstein-de Sitter universe changes from statically flat spatial
curvature to dynamically changing spatial curvature, it too is not in accord with the
assumption.
Tavakol offers two important reasons for adopting these assumptions, which he
calls the ‘stability framework’. One is that the framework addresses the problem of
relating idealized models to real systems. The other is that the framework addresses
the inaccuracy of observations.
First, idealization. There are a number of reasons that scientists use idealized
models. Some are practical. For example, one must invoke simplifying assump-
tions to make solving actual problems tractable (particularly if the dynamics is non-
linear). Some have a more epistemic character. As described in section one, in the
case where we use a simplified model to stand in for a real system, we would like
to know that any differences between the model and the system will not undermine
the model’s predictions, explanations, etc. For example, our universe is clearly not
exactly spatially homogeneous and isotropic, but we model it as if it were; if the
universe were structurally stable, then its small departures from homogeneity and
isotropy would not change its qualitative behavior of being (nearly) uniform. Our
cosmological models should reflect that stability when it exists, and we can check
that they do, in the example by introducing general perturbations into the FRW mod-
els to see if there are qualitative changes in behavior in the perturbed FRW models.
Second, inaccuracy. Real observations always involve some degree of inaccuracy
due to error. The stability framework addresses this problem by insuring that small
inaccuracies in measurement will not undermine the application of models whose
15 For historical accounts of the development of dynamical systems, see, e.g., (Aubin and Dahan-
Dalmedico, 2002; Holmes, 2010).
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parameters depend on these measurement results. So long as the model accurately
representing the real world is nearby (‘a perturbation away’), then we can expect that
predictions based on using the ‘inaccurate’ model will be approximately correct.
Thus, as Tavakol says, the stability framework “facilitate[s] the task of interpreting
observational and experimental data, by providing a theoretical framework...within
which such data can be analysed” (Tavakol, 1991, 148).
Nevertheless, assumption (a) is not an insubstantial assumption, and it has plau-
sibly been adopted largely for pragmatic reasons. As mentioned previously, that this
is so has become especially clear in the past century thanks to the phenomenon
of chaos in nonlinear dynamical systems, the applicability of which to real sys-
tems demonstrates that they are not necessarily structurally stable. Chaotic systems,
characterized by a sensitive dependence on initial conditions and a mixing dynam-
ics, entail a failure of deterministic predictability in chaotic models representing
them (Batterman, 1993; Holt and Holt, 1993; Leiber, 1997; Werndl, 2009). This is
yet another example of a violation of the stability framework. Thus this framework
cannot be used in such cases to account for idealizations and measurement inaccu-
racy; indeed, chaotic systems present a significant challenge for the interpretation
of empirical data and accounting for the confirmation of chaotic models (Rueger
and Sharp, 1996; Koperski, 1998; Batitsky and Domotor, 2007), for one must ap-
peal to alternative methods and justifications to secure the epistemic goods that were
previously licensed by the stability framework.
If we must give up the stability framework, then Tavakol claims that there are two
options: (1) hold onto dynamical determinism but adopt what he calls the ‘fragility
framework’ or (2) maintain stability at the expense of determinism by introducing
stochasticity. Each of these raises interesting philosophical challenges. On the one
hand, adopting the fragility framework amounts to accepting that real systems may
be structurally unstable, as a consequence of which our models must allow for the
corresponding kinds of instabilities. Of course stability is not an all or nothing af-
fair: one expects a spectrum of possibilities, in principle, between highly stable and
highly fragile. This in mind, Kamminga and Tavakol (1993) suggest, for example,
interpreting ceteris paribus clauses in laws of nature as identifying, roughly, the ab-
sence of relevant variability, which is to say the absence of the kind of perturbations
which would lead to changes in qualitative behavior. Still, giving up the stability
framework requires a different approach to understanding our modeling and test-
ing practices, as just noted. On the other hand, Tavakol’s example of maintaining
stability involves a redefinition of stability, one which then involves the necessary
introduction of an element of stochasticity. Stochasticity, of course, is a natural al-
ternative to conventional stability, as Poincare´ (1952, I.IV.II) and others pointed out
long ago. If this stochasticity is to be objective, however, then there is a philosophi-
cal challenge to taking up this strategy, namely of grounding the objectivity of these
deterministic probabilities (Lyon, 2011; Myrvold, 2012; McCoy, 2018b).
Applying these ideas in cosmology, then, either we accept the fragility frame-
work in cosmological modeling (and its attendant philosophical challenges) or we
adopt a statistical approach in cosmology (and its attendant philosophical chal-
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lenges).16 We are forced into this dilemma not just because many of the cosmo-
logical models that we know are unstable, however, but because we should expect
instability in general in cosmology: it is a general feature of nonlinear dynamical
systems, of which the systems described by general relativity are a kind.17 If this ar-
gument is right, then the rejection of a cosmological model, like the Einstein static
universe, solely on the basis of its instability under certain perturbations is surely
epistemically unjustified. It is, at best, a pragmatic decision which one might make
in the hopes of discovering a stable model, or, at least, a model stable under per-
turbations deemed relevant for assessing whether the idealizations of the model are
acceptable.
5 Conclusion
Determinism, probability, and causality are concepts that have long played impor-
tant roles in scientific, physical, and cosmological thinking; they have also been
central to philosophical discussions. The aim of this paper has been to draw some
attention to the significant role that stability considerations too have played in cos-
mology. My focus has been on two cases, the Einstein static universe and the flat-
ness problem, that I believe exhibit interesting aspects of stability in this historical
thread. It would be a mistake, of course, to drive any strong, general conclusions
on the basis of just these cases. Instead, I hope to have shown enough to suggest
the significance of stability in cosmology, some of the roles it can play, and how
attitudes towards it have changed.
In the first section I introduced the Einstein static universe and the de Sitter uni-
verse and derived some important consequences, such as the spherical geometry of
space and the condition for stability of the former. I then showed how Eddington
demonstrated the instability of the Einstein static universe to scalar perturbations of
the energy density ρ and pressure p. I related some of the historical consequences
of Eddington’s demonstration, including Einstein’s disavowal of his model and the
search by many cosmologists for a physical mechanism which could introduce a
perturbation that would lead to an expanding universe, as observations suggested
our universe was. Although empirical evidence provided the strongest argument for
rejecting the Einstein static universe, it seems that Eddington’s argument played an
important role—certainly in the case of Einstein.
In the second section I explained the flatness problem, which arises in the context
of the hot big bang model. Observations suggest that our universe is approximately
spatially flat, but the spatially flat FRW spacetime is unstable under perturbations.
This led some cosmologists to press a fine-tuning argument against the model, con-
cluding that the special initial conditions required to account for flatness were prob-
16 See (Tavakol and Ellis, 1988, 1990; Coley and Tavakol, 1992; Lidsey and Tavakol, 1993) for
Tavakol’s own application of his arguments to cosmology, including several examples.
17 This does not necessarily mean that we should expect cosmology to be chaotic, although that is
a conceptual possibility that has been investigated. See, e.g. (Coleman and Pietronero, 1992).
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lematic in a way that required a theoretical modification of the big bang model. The
proposed solution to the flatness problem was inflation, a stage of accelerated ex-
pansion in the very early universe. Although instability was not singled out as the
problem of the flat FRW spacetime, it is only because of the particular kind of insta-
bility that the initial conditions are as special as they are, whether that specialness is
understood in terms of probability or otherwise. The inflationary solution reverses
the dynamics, so to speak, in such a way that flatness becomes stable and the initial
conditions become less special.
In the third section I contextualized these two episodes by discussing stability in
general, with special attention given to the advances in dynamical systems theory,
and especially in nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory. I made use of Tavakol’s
alternative frameworks, the stability framework and fragility framework, discussing
the epistemic issues associated with each one. Tavakol draws particular attention
on the consequences of stability and fragility for idealization and inaccuracy. One
important conclusion that can be drawn from this general context is that there are
only pragmatic reasons to work within the stability framework, for it has become
clear that physical systems do in fact exhibit instabilities of various kinds.
Reflecting back on the cosmological episodes, we can see that an outright rejec-
tion of the Einstein static universe is epistemically unjustified, although it perhaps
can be motivated on pragmatic grounds. The response of Eddington, Lemaıˆtre, and
others, to make this instability an opportunity, appears to be better motivated; in
light of the subsequent fine-tuning arguments against the big bang model, however,
we can easily imagine their proposal being subject to fine-tuning arguments of vari-
ous kinds, for example in the posited equilibrium state, in the required perturbation
to obtain an expanding universe of the appropriate kind, and so on. This supposition
might make fine-tuning arguments appear spurious, and indeed this is a(n especially
philosophical) reaction to the later flatness problem. Although characterizing what is
problematic about special conditions in terms of instability or improbability cannot
be sustained, as I have argued elsewhere (McCoy, 2018a), I also believe the empir-
ical successes of inflationary cosmology should not be overlooked. The theory did
solve conceptual problems which did lead to progress (McCoy, forthcoming). It is
just not clear how to characterize these problems conceptually. One suggestion of
how that comes out of the discussion of stability here is that the instability of flat
FRW spacetimes points to the specialness of the idealizations that lead to it. That,
naturally, will have to be the topic for another time however.
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